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This dissertation examines the strategic decision of franchising firms to convert company-owned 
outlets to franchise contracts in response to persistent agency problems. Moreover, this study 
investigates how franchisor-level, market-level, and outlet-level characteristics interact with this 
relationship. Using a longitudinal sample of company-owned fast-food restaurants, I find that 
increased agency problems at focal restaurants increases the likelihood of being converted to a 
franchise and that this relationship is moderated by both franchisor- and outlet-level 
characteristics but not market-level characteristics. Limitations and future research opportunities 
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Agency theory is among the most prevalent theories of organization and management 
(Dalton, Hitt, Certo, & Dalton, 2007); however, the agency problem continues to challenge 
scholars and practitioners (Shi, Connelly, & Hoskisson, 2017). Agency problems arise because 
of the potential for mischief when the interests of managers deviate from those of the owners 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In such situations, and for various reasons, managers may attempt to 
extract greater rents than those contractually agreed upon by the owners (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Unfortunately, contracts that attempt to bond the interests of both parties are costly (e.g., 
incentives), as are the mechanisms used to enforce them (e.g., monitoring) (Fama & Jensen, 
1983b). Therefore, the focus of the theory is not only in determining when agency problems may 
arise, but which mechanisms are most effective for minimizing the tendency of managers to 
leverage their advantage (Eisenhardt, 1989; Fama & Jensen, 1983b; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Numerous reviews illustrate the extensive research on how firms attempt to mitigate the 
agency problem (e.g., Dalton et al., 2007; Eisenhardt, 1989; Kim & Mahoney, 2005). This vast 
line of research has uncovered a great deal of knowledge on curbing the agency problem, 
however, scholars also acknowledge that contracts and intervening mechanisms are imperfect 
instruments (Agarwal & Knoeber, 1996; Jap & Anderson, 2003; Parkhe, 1993), as agency 
problems still persist. Interestingly, how owners respond to such agency problems after the fact 
has attracted less research attention. Indeed, agency related research on the interaction between 
owners and agents tends to favor an ex ante position (Dalton et al., 2007; Kim & Mahoney, 
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2005), despite the seeming importance of responding to such problems occurring ex post. 
Therefore, the current study compliments the extant literature by explicitly examining one such 
response - ownership conversion, as a mechanism for remedying agency problems in the ex post 
setting, as well as a number of conditions that may strengthen or weaken this expected response. 
Examining the ex post setting is important for a number of reasons. First, because 
preemptive efforts to curtail agency problems may be unsuccessful, examining how principals 
respond to residual agency problems is important since lasting agency problems can erode the 
value of firm assets, increase costs, and damage important relationships (Jap & Anderson, 2003; 
Michael, 1998, Singh & Sirdeshmukh, 2000). However, and perhaps more importantly, decisions 
regarding agency remediation may look quite different in the ex post setting and, therefore, 
contingent upon a number of conditions. For example, organizational actions can provide 
information to key observers regarding firm attributes (Miller & Triana, 2009; Spence, 1974), 
which can impact firms economically (e.g., customer demand) and socially (e.g., desirability as a 
strategic partner) (Bergh, Connelly, Ketchen, & Shannon, 2014). Actions may also be contingent 
on the strategic importance of an asset (e.g., business unit) or the market it serves. Because these 
factors may influence how firms respond to agency problems, examining the factors that 
strengthen or weaken this response is important. Indeed, better understanding the boundary 
conditions that influence the ex post reactions of principals to potentially harmful agency 
problems has important implications for both theory development and practice. Therefore, this 
study also examines the moderating roles of owner-, market-, and business unit-level 
characteristics in ex post responses to agency problems.  
To investigate these questions, this study draws on business-format franchising to show 
how principals (e.g., franchisors) use business unit (e.g., retail outlet) ownership conversion – 
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defined as the change in ownership of a focal outlet from company to franchisee – as an ex post 
response to enduring agency problems. Franchising provides an excellent context with a well-
developed literature that has broadened our understanding of how firm’s attempt to mitigate 
agency concerns (Combs & Ketchen, 2003). For example, the ownership preference for new 
outlets, known as franchise choice, is determined by the franchisor at the time of establishment 
(Scott, 1995) and is based on observable local market factors (Combs & Ketchen, 2003). 
Furthermore, outlet ownership choice is assumed to remain fairly stable since the parent firm 
“has taken into account all relevant factors” at the time of establishment “and have chosen 
correctly and efficiently” (Parmigiani & Holloway, 2011:464). However, periodic monitoring 
may uncover evidence of agency problems at focal outlets, prompting the franchisor to modify 
the existing ownership structure (Manolis, Dahlstrom, & Nygaard, 1995). Despite anecdotal and 
objective evidence of such structural changes occurring within franchise systems over time (e.g., 
annual reports and franchise disclosure documents) and the strategic importance of responding to 
persistent agency problems, extant research on outlet ownership choice remains focused on ex 
ante selection. 
This study thereby makes a number of contributions. First, it explicitly extends agency 
theory into the ex post setting by examining the responses of franchisors to lasting agency 
problems at company-operated units. In doing so, utilizing the context of fast-food restaurant 
chains, I extend extant franchising literature by capturing ex post managerial agency at focal 
restaurants using health code violations and subsequently show that converting outlets to a 
franchise is an effective mechanism for solving such problems. Next, this study shows that 
franchisor responses to agency problems at focal restaurants are contingent upon various factors. 
Specifically, organizational- and outlet-level characteristics act as boundary conditions for 
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exercising ownership change in the ex post setting, whereas market-level characteristics appear 
to play less of a role. This is interesting because more prominent franchisors appear to be more 
likely to unload problematic stores onto franchisees than their less visible counterparts. Even 
though these outlets are problematic, the increased visibility of the chain helps to overcome this 
issue in terms of franchisee demand. Lastly, this study uses outlet-level, panel data, thereby 
contributing methodologically to the franchise literature by taking a more granular approach to 
changes in franchise choice which aggregate to impact system composition.  
In the sections that follow, I first review the relevant literature on agency theory, the 
mechanisms used to mitigate agency problems, and how this literature has been applied to 
franchise choice. Next, using arguments grounded in agency theory, I posit ownership 
conversion of company-managed units to franchised units as a mechanism for managing ex post 
agency problems. Then I propose boundary conditions that strengthen or weaken the tendency to 
use such a mechanism. Fourth, I describe the empirical setting and the method used for testing 
the hypotheses. Lastly, I provide results and a discussion of the limitations and implications of 







II. AGENCY THEORY, FRANCHISE CHOICE, AND THE EX ANTE SETTING 
Agency Theory  
A principal-agent relationship exists when one party (the principal) delegates authority to 
another (the agent), whose employment is expected to create value. How much value will result 
from this agreement, however, is unknown because of exogenous factors and uncertainty with 
regard to the agent’s effort. Agents are assumed to be competent, however, the interests of the 
two parties may diverge and in many situations information regarding agent inputs may be 
difficult to assess and the mechanisms for detecting agency problems, monitoring agent inputs, 
and aligning the interests of both parties can be costly (Eisenhardt, 1989). Thus, the focus of the 
theory is not only in determining situations in which agency problems may arise, but which 
mechanisms are most efficient for governing the principal-agent relationship (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Both parties are assumed to be self-interested utility maximizers. Because of this, 
managers (i.e., agents) seek to maximize their utility at the expense of the firm by withholding 
effort (i.e., shirking) or attempting to increase their compensation through self-dealing. Barring 
perfect information regarding agent behavior, agents are inclined to conceal such information 
and owners will bear the cost. Therefore, principals attempt to mitigate at least a portion of these 
two dominant features of the agency problem: diverging interests and information asymmetry 
(Cohen, Holder-Webb, Sharp, & Pant, 2007). First, principals can structure contracts in a way 
that more closely aligns the interests of both parties through the use of outcome- or behavior-
based compensation contracts (Eisenhardt, 1989). Second, principals can use monitoring 
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mechanisms (e.g., management information systems and auditors) to increase visibility of agent 
behavior (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  
Dalton and colleagues (2007) masterfully synthesize extant literature on three 
mechanisms commonly researched in this vast literature: independence (monitoring), equity 
(ownership), and the market for external control1. Independence refers to the independence of 
those in charge of monitoring managerial action (e.g., boards of directors), arguing that the 
structure and leadership of the governing body impacts the effectiveness of monitoring. For 
instance, if a board is composed of insiders (e.g., officers of the firm) or affiliates of the 
incumbent CEO, it is reasonable to assume a low degree of independence compared to those 
external to the firm and monitoring will be less rigorous (Daily, Johnson, & Dalton, 1999). To 
date, an extensive body of research suggests that there is little evidence supporting the 
relationship between board composition and financial performance (Bhagat & Black, 2002; 
Coles, McWilliams, & Sen, 2001; Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998; Kaufman & 
Englander, 2005) or is modest at best (Rhoades, Rechner, & Sundaramurthy, 2000; Wagner, 
Stimpert, & Fubara, 1998). What is clear in this corpus of literature is that the rationale behind 
this research considers board independence a monitoring mechanism that, when formed ex ante, 
serves to mitigate future agency concerns.  
Another pillar of agency-based research argues that equity ownership influences firm 
performance (Fama & Jensen, 1983a, 1983b; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). According to Jensen & 
Meckling (1976), agent equity ownership is thought to facilitate the alignment of interests with 
those of the principals. For example, as the agent’s ownership stake declines, it is argued that 
                                                 
1 The mechanisms reviewed here are by no means exhaustive as agency researchers have examined many others 




their “fractional claim on outcome” is reduced, thus increasing the likelihood of appropriating 
larger levels of firm resources as perquisites (p. 313). Similarly, early research in this stream 
argued that agents with less equity may be more inclined to shirk (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985) or 
direct company funds into projects more aligned with personal interests than that of the owners 
(Shliefer & Vishny, 1997). Hall (2000: 122) suggests that equity options are the “best” 
mechanism for aligning manager interests with those of the stakeholders. In fact, empirical 
evidence supports the notion that equity ownership incentivizes managerial behavior more so 
than standard compensation alone (Core, Guay, & Verrecchia, 2003; Hall & Liebman, 1998; 
Jensen & Murphy, 1990; Murphy, 1985). Research also supports a positive relationship between 
equity-based compensation and firm performance (Core et al., 2003; Mehran, 1995) though the 
optimal balance between equity-ownership and agency mitigation remains in question. 
Moreover, as noted in the following by Core et al., (2003: 32), equity-based compensation is 
typically framed in the literature as an ex ante mechanism for aligning the interests of both 
parties:  
“A fundamental reason for the use of equity incentives is the desire by firms to link changes in 
executive wealth directly to changes in stock price, thereby providing executives with incentives 
to maximize shareholder wealth…if shareholders (or the board of directors) could directly 
observe…the executive’s actions and know beforehand which actions would maximize 
shareholder wealth, no incentives (including equity incentives) would be necessary. However, 
because shareholders do not know and cannot specify every action an executive should take in 
every scenario (that is, the first-best contract cannot be implemented), the firm must instead 
delegate many of these choices to the executive, who presumably has superior information about 
many of these decisions. To motivate the executive to take actions that are in the best interests of 
the shareholders, compensation risk is imposed on the executive by linking the executive’s 
wealth to firm performance (that is, the second-best contract is used).” 
 
 The market for external control is thought to be a mechanism of last resort (Dalton, et al. 
2007). Based on the efficient market hypothesis, it is assumed that the market will correct for 
excessive agency costs generated from the actions of self-interested managers which will result 
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in the undervaluing of firm assets by others in the equity market. Specifically, the firm’s assets 
are devalued because future expectations are depressed due to managerial inefficiency, shirking, 
and misconduct (Hawley & Williams, 2000). As a result, attentive management teams identify 
the firm as undervalued, at which point they will attempt to take over, changing the management 
and strategy to enhance the value of the firm’s assets (Bebchuk & Fried, 2009). The market for 
external control has been argued as an effective mechanism for outing entrenched managers 
(Jensen & Chew, 2000), thus mitigating shareholder risk from poor management practices and 
signaling to managers the need to place shareholder interests above their own (Jensen, 1984; 
Jensen & Ruback, 1983).  
Common actions researched in the market for corporate control include hostile takeovers, 
mergers, leveraged buyouts, stockholder buyouts, and divestitures, though there are many other 
potential levers (Jensen, 1984). Describing this activity as a “blunt instrument”, Hawley & 
Williams (2000) suggest that the market for corporate control is effective for resolving extreme 
performance failures. Dalton and colleagues (2007: 27) note that such a mechanism is “used to 
correct [performance failures] after they have already occurred, thereby rendering it effective ex 
post rather than ex ante”, however, they concede that “an active market for corporate control and 
a viable threat of takeover may dampen some opportunistic behavior.” In a similar fashion to the 
agency mitigating mechanisms discussed above, extant literature frames the market for corporate 
control as an ex ante mechanism for preventing managerial inefficiency (Fama & Jensen, 1983a; 
Jensen & Ruback, 1983; Manne, 1965). Therefore, explicitly highlighting the mechanisms used 
in the ex post setting, and within different contexts, is useful for extending our understanding of 
the appropriateness and utility of such tools. 
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Although much of the agency literature has been developed in the context of the 
corporation and CEOs, where boards of directors are designated as the primary monitoring body 
over managerial actions, equity ownership is hypothesized as stock and stock options, and 
leveraged buyouts and corporate raiding, stockholder buyouts, divestitures, spin-offs, and 
liquidations represent the market for corporate control, similar conceptualizations of these 
agency mechanisms have been useful for explaining phenomena in other contexts as well. In 
fact, agency theory has been noted as one of the most successful theories for predicting 
franchising as a strategy and subsequently, franchise choice (Perryman & Combs, 2012). Indeed, 
not only does agency theory provide theoretical rationale for explaining why firms choose to 
franchise in the first place, its premises also explain which outlets should be franchised or 
company-operated (i.e., franchise choice). Rubin (1978) was one of the first in this line of 
research to view franchising as a solution to agency concerns. Using the above framework as a 
guide, I review the franchising literature from an agency perspective. 
Agency Theory and Franchising 
 Scholarly interest in the use of franchising as an organizational strategy dates back to the 
seminal work of Oxenfeldt and Kelly (1976). Many explanations for franchising have emerged 
since then, ranging from resource scarcity (Oxenfeldt & Kelly, 1976), signaling (Gallini & Lutz, 
1991), transaction costs (Kim & Mahoney, 2005), to agency (Rubin, 1978). Though each has 
added to our understanding of franchising and related phenomena (e.g., franchise choice), agency 
theory has received arguably the most empirical support in the extant literature (Perryman & 
Combs, 2012). Accordingly, the agency literature on franchising has long recognized agency 
costs as a significant determinant in the use of franchising. Indeed, numerous studies have 
recognized geographical distance and outlet dispersion as salient factors regarding employee 
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monitoring and motivation (Brickley & Dark, 1987; Kalnins & Lafontaine, 2013). Research 
suggests that hiring, retaining, and monitoring employees was found to be one of the biggest 
concerns for restaurant managers (Enz, 2004) and increased travel costs has been shown to have 
a negative effect on plant investment and plant productivity at the firm level (Giroud, 2013).  
Testing the notion between outlet and chain headquarters location, Brickley and Dark 
(1987) show that chains are more likely to franchise an establishment as it gets farther from 
headquarters. Similarly, Lafontaine (1992) finds that as chain outlets become more 
geographically dispersed, chains tend to prefer franchising over company-ownership. This view 
explains franchising as a mechanism for mitigating agency concerns or problems associated with 
motivating managers to perform as expected in geographically distant locations. Franchising is 
effective because it motivates the franchisee, as a semi-independent owner, to self-monitor and 
pay attention to the outlet’s daily operations (Dahlsrom & Nygaard, 1994). In other words, 
franchising reduces the franchisor’s need to closely monitor distant outlets because franchisees 
are motivated to be efficient as the residual claimants of the profits in their outlets (Norton, 
1988). Therefore, the literature on franchising suggests that franchisors may reduce employee 
moral hazard by apportioning ownership rights to a local business person (Scott, 1995). 
Although compensating employee managers with salaries and bonuses tied to outlet 
performance is a useful alternative for aligning the interests of both parties (Bradach, 1997), it 
may still be difficult for principals (e.g., franchisors) to know whether outlet performance is 
attributable to managerial effort or factors outside their control (Carney & Gedajlovic, 1991). 
Therefore, when franchisors cannot be certain that managers are following protocol and adhering 
to operational standards, increased monitoring and associated costs remain salient. As discussed 
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in the previous section, it is when monitoring becomes overly costly that the incentives tied to 
ownership of an outlet becomes attractive (Combs & Ketchen, 1999).  
Supporting this agency perspective are numerous literature reviews (Combs, Ketchen, 
Shook, & Short, 2011; Combs, Michael, & Castrogiovanni, 2004; Dant, Paswan, & Kaufmann, 
1996; Lafontaine & Slade, 1997) and a meta-analysis (Combs & Ketchen, 2003). Franchising has 
indeed been shown to be more prevalent when outlets are costlier to monitor. For example, when 
outlets are physically located farther from monitors (Brickley & Dark, 1987), are culturally 
distant (Fladmoe-Lindquist & Jacque, 1995), and when franchisee inputs (i.e., local knowledge 
and decision making) are more salient for operations and difficult to evaluate (Lafontaine, 1992; 
Minkler, 1992).  
On the other hand, research suggests that while franchising may reduce monitoring costs, 
it creates unique agency concerns between franchisors and franchisees as both are incentivized to 
act opportunistically (Scott, 1995). This occurs because franchising involves a trade-off between 
the costs of monitoring outlet managers and free-riding (Caves & Murphy, 1976; Lafontaine, 
1992; Rubin, 1978). In the context of franchising, Combs and colleagues (Combs et al., 2004; 
Perryman & Combs, 2012) describe these differences in agency costs as vertical and horizontal 
agency. Vertical agency refers to the classic problem of agents withholding effort when not 
closely observed (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972), and horizontal agency refers to agents taking 
actions to help themselves at the cost of the franchise system and other nearby agents (i.e., 
franchisees). This is important because when franchisor inputs are highly valued (e.g., brand 
value), franchisees have an incentive to free-ride by taking actions to increase local profits at the 
cost of the franchisor and other system members making company ownership preferred (Brickley 
& Dark, 1987; Combs & Ketchen, 1999; Lafontaine, 1992). However, given both costs, Michael 
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(2000b) found that for many franchisors the monitoring cost advantages of franchising still 
outweigh those associated with free-riding.  
Franchising and the Ex Ante Setting 
 Although much has been learned through this vast amount of research, reviewing both the 
corporate agency literature and the franchising literature it is evident that research has focused on 
how principals anticipate and attempt to mitigate agency concerns (Dalton et al., 2007; Hawley 
& Williams, 2000). Franchising firms initially do so through the ownership allocation process at 
the time of outlet establishment (Scott, 1995). At this stage, parent firms have no doubt “taken 
into account all relevant factors and have chosen correctly and efficiently” based on obtainable 
information (Parmigiani & Holloway, 2011: 464). Hence, much of the extant research grounded 
in agency theory displays an interest in new outlet ownership decisions rather than post-
establishment changes among incumbents (see Combs & Ketchen, 2003, Kalnins & Lafontaine, 
2004; Perryman & Combs, 2012).  
Additionally, theory and measurement tend toward more static and abstract, firm-level 
hypotheses and operationalization compared to dynamic outlet-level specifications, resulting in a 
less granular understanding of ownership choice phenomena. For example, many studies use 
cross-sectional data to estimate the proportion franchised, a firm-level variable, and a number of 
independent firm-level variables – for example: age, geographical dispersion, distance to HQ, 
franchisor inputs, growth rate, etc. – (e.g., Alon, 2001; Brickley & Dark, 1987; Combs & 
Ketchen, 1999; Scott, 1995; Shane, 1998). Michael (1996) used franchise organizational form 
share, an industry-level variable similar to product-market share, to capture the choice of 
franchising as predicted by the level of business risk (i.e., percent of failure over past three 
years). Combs and Ketchen (2003) provide an excellent meta-analytical review of this literature 
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which includes forty-four total studies measuring firms’ use of franchising, twenty-nine of which 
use agency-related variables. Some notable exceptions use outlet-level data for explaining 
ownership allocation decisions, however, these were usually among new establishments (e.g., 
Kalnins & Lafontaine, 2004; Perryman & Combs, 2012) and do not explicitly account for 
changes in ownership.  
Although research suggests that initial ownership decisions are both stable and difficult to 
change (Lafontaine & Shaw, 2005; Argyres & Liebeskind, 1999; Nickerson & Zenger, 2002; 
Puranam et al.  2006), issues may arise post-establishment that threaten the value of the chain for 
its numerous stakeholders. Because of this, research is needed to better understand the 
mechanisms used for managing agency problems in the ex post setting, after all other mitigating 
mechanisms have failed. Furthermore, an explanation regarding the differences between the ex 
post setting and the ex ante setting are warranted and how managing agency problems within the 
former is impacted by potential boundary conditions.  
In the next section, using the fast-food franchise industry as a backdrop, I argue that 
franchisors use ownership conversion as one remedy for post-establishment agency problems 
(e.g., health code violations) at company-operated restaurants. In other words, when employee-
managed restaurants become too costly to monitor and incentives become ineffective, franchisors 
will convert the restaurant to a franchise operation. On one hand, this action signals to observers 
that free-riding is not tolerated, especially by company-operated restaurants, however, converting 







III. OWNERSHIP CONVERSION AS A SOLUTION FOR EX POST AGENCY 
PROBLEMS 
Agency Problems in Employee-Managed Outlets 
Agency theory views the firm as a nexus of contracts which specify the rights of agents 
within the organization (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). These rights fall into three general groups: 
decision management, decision control, and residual claims (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Decision 
management involves the initiation and implementation of decisions with regard to resource 
utilization. Decision control includes the ratification and monitoring of these choices, while 
residual claims is the right to the net cash flows or profits from the execution of these decisions. 
Agency theory argues that uniting decision processes and residual claims reduces the concern for 
agency and thus supports organizational efficiency (Fama & Jensen, 1983). For employee-
managed outlets of restaurant chains, decision control and residual claims are held by the owners 
of the chain, however, the implementation of strategic decisions and the use of outlet resources 
(e.g., the owner’s production system) often fall to the local manager. It is in this capacity that 
agency theorists suggest that employee-managers are given the opportunity to leverage their 
advantage to extract rents from residual claimants in the form of reduced effort and concealment 
of information (Krueger, 1991; Lafontaine & Slade, 2002; Michael, 1998). Brickley and Dark 
(1987: 403) note that for various reasons, “not all individuals within the firm can be expected to 




A common role of an employee-manager is to oversee the daily operations at local 
outlets. For restaurants, this often includes the supervision of inputs, the processing and 
production of standardized meals, sales functions, attention to restaurant maintenance needs, and 
end-user engagement. Many of these functions involve extensive coordination and utilization of 
human resources and supervision of these activities can greatly influence compliance with 
operational standards and, in turn, output quality (Michael, 1998). However, even though 
managers are compensated for their efforts and may be given incentives tied to local 
performance, they are not as strongly incentivized as residual claimants (Kaufmann & 
Lafontaine, 1994), nor do they have ownership rights bonding their short-term actions to the 
long-term value of the operation (Lutz, 1995). Moreover, the work hours of employee-managers 
are regulated and they may be less motivated to provide extra effort in terms of customer service 
or to develop a communal rapport with customers compared to residual claimants (e.g., refilling 
coffee for patrons during morning rush; Love, 1986). Wolensky (1993) suggests that the 
endurance and improvement of operational standards requires commitment from both managers 
and their subordinates, therefore, without strong incentives tied to the net profits of the outlet 
employee-managers may shirk on their responsibilities or withhold useful information for 
improving the local operation (Minkler, 1990; Lafontaine & Bhattacharyya, 1995). 
 Throughout their tenure, managers of local restaurants will gain knowledge about the 
local environment, the community, and other implicit information. This specific knowledge can 
be useful for creating value for both customers (Hayek, 1945) and the chain. Transferring this 
information can be costly as it requires synthetization and communication to central-agents, 
some of which may even be harmful for managers as it could signal attributes of their 
management quality. Employee-managers may be less inclined to scan for growth opportunities, 
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act upon remediable deficiencies in the local labor market (e.g., after-school employment 
programs and workforce training), or respond appropriately to customer requests or complaints 
because doing so goes beyond typical contractual arrangements. Additionally, employees have 
less incentive to act upon local information (e.g., responding to customer desires) since they do 
not gain significantly from the residuals of the outlet nor do they benefit from the value created 
from the future sale of the outlet (Lutz, 1995). Therefore, the full value of local knowledge may 
be underutilized in focal outlets with employee-managers.  
Agency Remediation 
Although there are a number of potential remediation mechanisms available to restaurant 
chain owners for addressing agency problems in employee-managed outlets, this study focuses 
on the decision of owners to convert the incumbent outlet to a franchise for the following 
reasons: 1) franchisors are assumed to have taken into account all relevant variables at the time 
of establishment and chosen appropriately the most optimal choice for the outlet (Parmigiani & 
Holloway, 2011); and 2) franchisors are assumed to place competent agents into managerial 
positions, maintain efforts to monitor the outlet, incentivize agents (e.g., bonuses), take efforts to 
train managers, or replace inefficient managers in an attempt to reduce agency problems. 
Consequently, because persistent ex post agency problems at employee-managed restaurants 
may be indicative of more complex issues, I argue that ownership conversion is the ‘ultimate 
lever’ to remedy such problems.  
Ownership Conversion  
Franchise disclosure documents of restaurant chains often list non-renewal, termination, 
and ownership transfer (e.g., conversion) as alternative options for resolving non-compliance, 
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fraudulent, or otherwise injurious acts in franchised outlets. However, how similar issues are 
handled in company-operated outlets, and when these options are carried out, is not well 
documented. Though outlet closure is certainly a viable mechanism for eliminating the 
systematic effects of agency, permitting an outlet with on-going agency problems to continue 
operating will eventually lead to the same conclusion (i.e., closure; Bernstein & Sheen, 2016). 
Compared to this alternative, conversion offers a number of benefits to the system in addition to 
agency remediation. Conversion can signal the franchisor’s expectations of incumbent and future 
system members’ compliance to standards and the consequences of non-compliance, thus 
reducing uncertainty for investors (e.g., future franchisees or shareholders). Similarly, 
conversion may also convey to customers and other observers (e.g., regulators, special interest 
groups, etc.) the franchisor’s commitment to product and service quality. Importantly, 
conversion enables the firm to retain system size, an outcome salient to shareholders and 
analysts, while displaying expected actions important to those that more frequently interact and 
collaborate with the firm (Mishina, Block, & Mannor, 2012; Parker, Krause, & Devers, 2018).  
From a strategic resource perspective, franchisors may be motivated to convert outlets 
over closure because many outlet locations were selected at the time of establishment for 
competitive reasons. For example, placing outlets near sister units can result in positive 
externalities (McCann & Folta, 2011; Woo, Cannella, & Mesquita, 2017) and such prime real 
estate may be hard to replace2. From a real options perspective, maintaining some connection to 
these outlet locations may better serve future organizational objectives compared to outright 
termination. Furthermore, research suggests that converting company-operated outlets to 
franchises can reduce the franchisor’s capital expenditures associated with upkeep of the real 
                                                 
2 Though this notion implicitly covers real estate owned by the franchisor, it can include existing lease contracts. 
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estate (Jackson & Jung, 2017). Franchisors may also benefit by converting problem outlets 
through the collecting of franchise fees and royalties in lieu of the burden of continued operation. 
In a situation where a company-owned outlet is damaging the system and its constituents, the 
franchisor may make better returns by transferring the outlet to a reputable franchisee while also 
capitalizing on an opportunity to reward franchisees for quality and performance (Gillis, 
McEwan, Crook, & Michael, 2011).  
Health Code Violations as Agency Problems 
Maintaining minimum standards is an important concept in business-format franchising 
(Caves & Murphy, 1976). Indeed, franchisors periodically assess whether individual outlets are 
in compliance with minimum standards via inspections from either private corporate agent, 
public reports generated by regulatory agencies, or both (Brickley & Dark, 1987; Pitegoff, 1989). 
The results of such inspections provide a basis for assessing managerial behaviors in outlets, 
such as underinvestment of inputs (i.e., shirking) and concealment of information. Research 
suggests that such behavior positively effects agency costs (e.g., monitoring costs) (Dahlstrom & 
Nygaard, 1999) and are salient threats to franchise systems (Combs et al.  2011; Lafontaine & 
Shaw, 2005). Others have shown that restaurants deviating from regulatory standards places the 
profitability, brand value, and reputation of the whole chain at risk (Scott, 1995; Worsfold, 
2006). For example, Bernstein and Sheen (2016) find that restaurant locations with higher health 
violations were positively correlated with outlet closure. Persistent agency problems among 
restaurant outlets can negatively impact customer demand and retention, and for franchisors, 
agency can harm the attractiveness of the chain’s brand as an investment option for would-be 
franchisees (Caves & Murphy, 1976).  
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I conceptualize health code violations at restaurant outlets as indicative of local 
managerial agency problems. Health code violations refer to the regular inspections of public 
food service establishments for the assurance of compliance with sanitation and safety laws.  
Health code inspection reports are a formal and systematic third-party evaluation conducted by 
experts, which provide trusted information about organizations and their offerings, inform 
stakeholder expectations, and facilitate market exchanges (Wry, Lounsbury, & Jennings, 2014; 
Wang, Wezel, & Forgues, 2016). Expert reports give observers an opportunity to scrutinize and 
interpret actions at each outlet and, therefore, base their evaluation of the outlet on these 
underlying characteristics (Basdeo et al., 2006; Philippe & Durand, 2011).  As a form of agency, 
violations can increase costs and have spillover effects which threaten the brand value and 
viability of affiliated outlets and ultimately the franchise system as a whole. This occurs because 
outlets with high violations can reduce consumer confidence (Klein, 1974) and negatively impact 
brand offerings (Choi & Kim, 1996; Worsfold, 2006), which can harm the chain’s ability to draw 
consumers and charge premium prices for their products. Furthermore, outlets with a history of 
violations may be deemed by observers as more culpable for future adverse actions, which may 
consequently inflict more damage to the chain’s brand (Zou, Zeng, Zeng, & Shi, 2014).  
Health Code Violations and Ownership Conversion 
In fast-food restaurants, managers and employees are responsible for maintaining product 
quality, the customer experience, and health and safety regulations. In situations where health 
code standards are being neglected in a company-outlet, one may likely question the outlet’s 
product or service quality. Product and service quality are important for customers of fast-food 
chains as they reduce uncertainty by providing a sense of conformity to expectations regardless 
of the location (Caves & Murphy, 1976). Therefore, increased violations may be indicative of 
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slack managerial effort in upholding product and service standards, which can ultimately harm 
customer demand. Reports on health conditions can also provide the franchisor with useful third-
party information about company-managed outlets in place of direct and costly monitoring. This 
source of information helps to increase the visibility of potential product and service problems at 
focal outlets.  
Questionable behavior within an organization can damage the trust of stakeholders, 
especially if they are deemed to be more than isolated events (Lewicki, McAllister, & Bies, 
1998). For franchisors, persistent violations at company outlets may jeopardize the trust 
franchisees have in the firm’s ability to protect the value of their personal investments (Davies, 
Lassar, Manolis, Prince, & Winsor, 2011). Distrust can also lead observers to assume harmful 
motives from the organization (Deutsch, 1958; Lewicki, 2007; Lumineau, 2017). Excessive and 
continued violations at company-outlets may be indicative of a stable attribute of the firm and 
signal that the franchisor permits free-riding on the efforts of others in the system (Devers, 
Dewett, Mishina, & Belsito, 2009). Moreover, company-operated outlets may be perceived by 
observers as having greater control and consequently be judged more harshly (Dutton & 
Dukerich, 1991). Subsequently, excessive violations at company-operated outlets may be met 
with greater contempt, disgust, and scrutiny (Devers et al., 2009; Goffman, 1963). Events that 
damage a firm’s brand may be deemed more newsworthy and draw greater media attention 
(Berrone, Fosfuri, Gelabert, & Gomez-Mejia, 2013; Fombrun, Gardberg, & Sever, 2000). 
Moreover, this added attention may come from more prestigious media sources, which are 
thought to be more reliable sources of information and have a greater impact on the perceptions 
of observers (Rhee & Valdez, 2009). Consequently, another issue for company-operated outlets 
is that illegitimate behaviors at these locations opens the franchisor to greater litigation risk since 
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there is no legal separation between the outlet and the firm (see Patterson v. Domino’s Pizza, 
2014). 
On the other hand, transferring company outlets to franchisees risks signaling poor 
performance and corporate management issues to key organizational observers (e.g., 
shareholders and analysts). However, franchisors may relinquish control at problem outlets to 
avoid perhaps even greater negative signals to other salient observers (e.g., franchisees and 
regulatory agents). Because persistent and excessive violations at a focal outlet can signal 
escalation of commitment or a tolerance for poor quality, franchisors will be motivated to 
respond by selling off company outlets to avoid being perceived by franchisees as corporate free-
riders. Wang, Wezel, and Forgues (2016) suggest that firms are more likely to respond to severe 
threats compared to weaker ones because doing so is more justifiable. Doing so should convey to 
incumbent and prospective franchisees that the franchisor cares about maintaining a reputation 
for quality, preserving partner relations and mutual performance among system members. 
Perhaps most important among these is the relationship with franchisees since franchisor 
complacency could negatively impact trust between them and franchisees. For a relational form 
like franchising, trust is important for fostering openness, creating confidence, decreasing 
uncertainty, and encouraging knowledge sharing and joint problem-solving (Lumineu, 2017).  
In summary, company outlets with excessive violations may indicate a deficiency in local 
resources (Oxenfeldt & Kelley, 1968), increase monitoring costs (Martin, 1988), and send a 
number of signals to key observers, which may motivate the conversion of such outlets to more 
capable managers. Additionally, excessive violations at corporately managed outlets may ‘poison 
the well’, so to speak, as complacency for illegitimate behavior may signal that such actions are 
acceptable for others. Instilling such a culture could further harm the firm’s brand value and 
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reputation. Lastly, assuming it is more logical to capture royalties and fees from franchisees 
compared to closing an outlet altogether, I predict the following: 
Hypothesis 1: Company-managed restaurants with persistent health violations have an 
increased likelihood of being converted to a franchise contract. 
Moderating Factors 
Although persistent agency problems can negatively impact franchise systems, 
franchisors may respond differently to agency problems under certain conditions in the ex post 
setting. This is because such actions signal change to the status quo, which may pique the interest 
of certain observers or create issues for salient strategic objectives. For franchise chains, the 
decision to act upon agency problems may, therefore, be contingent upon factors related to the 
chain itself, the markets being served, or characteristics of the outlet. For example, some 
restaurant chains are more visible in the media than others or charge higher fees for membership, 
while some markets are more attractive and strategically valuable than others, and lastly, outlet 
characteristics vary from one location to the next. Therefore, I suspect that these factors will 
impact how franchisors respond to persistent ex post agency problems among company-operated 
outlets.  
Chain Characteristics 
 Media visibility Research suggests that observable actions convey information to key 
observers regarding organizational attributes (Miller & Triana, 2009; Spence, 1974). Such 
information can impact firms economically (e.g., customer demand) and socially (e.g., 
desirability as a strategic partner) (Bergh et al., 2014), and with increased media coverage, firm 
actions may be observed by larger audiences. Larger audiences increase the awareness of such 
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actions and may exacerbate these economic and social concerns. As Mishina, Dykes, Block, & 
Pollock (2010: 706) note, “a firm’s prominence reflects the degree to which external audiences 
are aware of its existence, as well as the extent to which they view it as relevant and salient.” In 
the franchising context, visibility may influence the desire to be associated with a chain’s brand 
(Kaufmann, 1999). For example, when making investment decisions among numerous chains, 
new franchisees may rely on all available information, as well as the opinion of others, to reduce 
uncertainty (Podolny, 1994).  
Visibility is an important aspect of reputation (Lang & Lang, 1988), which facilitates the 
inflow of investment (Sirri & Tufano, 1998) and helps foster relationships with others (Chung, 
Singh, & Lee, 2000). This is because aligning with prominent firms improves market value for 
those associated with them (Stuart, Hoang, & Hybels, 1999). Media coverage affects a firm’s 
visibility and serves as a vehicle by which opinions of organizations are formed, bringing 
attention to the salience of certain issues (Deephouse, 2000). Along with outside observers, the 
chain itself may, at least partially, base their reputational identity on the amount of media 
attention they receive. Research has shown that people desire to work for, and with, highly 
reputable firms because they gain intrinsic value through the association, which helps reduce 
talent turnover (Dineen & Allen, 2016) and facilitates access to superior resources and more 
favorable transaction terms for the firm (D’Aveni, 1996). 
Although high visibility confers many benefits, it also brings about a fair amount of 
problems. A potential side-effect of high visibility is increased scrutiny from constituents and 
increased media attention (George, Dahlander, Graffin, & Sim, 2016). For these firms, violations 
of expected norms can cause the number of evaluators to increase and encourage the search for 
other grievances to ‘pile-on’ to existing ones (Wiesenfeld, Wurthmann, & Hambrick, 2008). This 
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is important because franchise chains often rely on existing and prospect franchisees for system 
growth. Therefore, franchisors face a dilemma when it comes to converting poorly operated 
company outlets to this stakeholder group. Though problematic outlets may damage other system 
members (Caves & Murphy, 1976), franchisors risk damaging their reputation as a quality 
franchise partner and impair their ability to attract high-quality partners (Fombrun et al. 2000; 
Turban & Cable, 2003; Turban & Greening, 1997). Unloading poor quality outlets on good 
franchisees may be perceived as opportunistic behavior and risks damaging the trust among 
existing and prospect franchisees (Davies et al., 2011; Lumineau, 2017). Similarly, converting 
company outlets to franchisees may risk signaling poor performance and deeper organizational 
management issues to key observers (e.g., franchisees, shareholders, and analysts). For example, 
discarding problematic outlets onto franchisees may signal the firm’s inability to manage the 
system and raise questions about the chain’s investment value. Extreme actions regarding agency 
problems may also signal to consumers a product or service quality problem and citing such 
action as a remedy for uncontrollable agency will undoubtedly serve to undermine the chain’s 
reputation.  
  In sum, though persistent violations at company-operated outlets warrant a response 
from the franchisor, in the ex post setting, this relationship may be reduced when a franchisor 
experiences more media visibility. This is because media visibility exposes the franchisor to 
broader audiences. In other words, converting troubled restaurants to franchisees may be 
perceived as opportunistic behavior, potentially damaging the trust that franchisees have in the 
franchisor as a partner, as well as signaling the franchisor’s inability to manage the system and 
potential product quality issues. Since strategic actions can signal trouble, outlets with persistent 
agency problems may not be converted to franchises because doing so adversely separates the 
25 
 
chain from others in their industry (Bergh et al., 2014). For chains with greater visibility, this 
signal may be even stronger than their less visible counterparts. Because of these issues, I predict 
the following: 
Hypothesis 2a: The franchisor’s media visibility negatively moderates the relationship 
between company-outlet health violations and conversion to franchise, such that the 
relationship decreases as media visibility increases. 
 Royalty Rates The cost of membership into franchise systems varies. Initial and on-going 
fees have been shown to influence the perception of risk associated with a particular chain (Sen, 
1993). Franchise fees are the one-time lump-sum fees that cover the initial contract period and, 
in some cases, subsequent renewals (Justis & Judd, 1998). Royalties, on the other hand, are 
perpetual fees, often based on some metric of performance (e.g., sales). One proposed purpose 
for royalties is to induce both parties to meet their contractual obligations, however, they also 
send important signals. For example, such costs have been shown to signal to franchisees the 
franchisor’s criteria for partner selection, commitment to training and support, product 
promotion, the monitoring expectations of outlet operations standards (Sen, 1993) and potential 
returns on investment (Shane, 1998). 
Since franchise fees are often one-time fees to cover the cost of initial training and 
promotion for newly franchised outlets, they may be less incentivizing for the franchisor to 
convert company-outlets to franchisees compared to on-going royalties. Intuitively, converting a 
problematic outlet to a franchise may solve agency problems while providing a stream of income 
for the franchisor. However, because outlets operated under the franchisor’s direct control 
provide greater information about potential problems in a particular outlet, and charging higher 
royalties suggests their commitment to support the franchisee (Stern & El-Ansary, 1988), they 
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may be less inclined to convert such an outlet since doing so will undoubtedly require significant 
on-going support and monitoring. Moreover, armed with superior information about the outlet, 
franchisors may recognize that agency problems are more systemic to the location itself, 
therefore, converting an outlet to a franchisee would be pointless. Lastly, because of the higher 
royalty rates, converting problem outlets to franchisees may be perceived as opportunistic 
behavior and consequently hurt the franchisor’s reputation as a franchise partner.  
In sum, though persistent violations at company-operated outlets warrant a response from 
the franchisor, in the ex post setting, this relationship may be reduced when the franchisor 
charges higher royalties. Higher royalty rates signal potential profitability for would-be 
franchisees but also the expected commitment of the franchisor to put forth in training and other 
support activities for new franchisees. By converting an outlet to a franchise shifts the residual 
earnings to the franchisee, meaning the franchisor’s interests are reduced. Furthermore, because 
an outlet with high violations will undoubtedly require extensive on-going support from the 
franchisor, which will incur greater costs, the franchisor may be more reluctant to release 
problematic company-outlets. Therefore, I predict that royalty rates moderate the relationship 
between company-outlet health violations and conversion to a franchisee, such that higher 
royalty rates will reduce the likelihood of conversion. Stated formally: 
Hypothesis 2b: The franchisor’s royalty rate negatively moderates the relationship 
between company-outlet health violations and conversion to franchise, such that the 




Market Size Market characteristics play a key role in predicting ownership allocation in 
the franchise choice literature (see Kalnins & Lafontaine, 2004; Perryman & Combs, 2012). 
Franchisors are assumed to prefer markets large enough to support multiple outlets under a single 
area manager (Carney & Gedajlovic, 1991). Indeed, research supports the preference of 
franchisors to locate company-operated outlets in more populous locations (e.g., Norton, 1988) 
because large market locations enable firms to be near large sets of potential customers 
(Brickley, Linck, & Smith, 2003) and can facilitate new product and service development 
(personal communication with representative of Rourke Capital, November 24, 2017). Perryman 
and Combs (2012:376) note that “less populous markets are less important to the franchisor, 
[and] are unlikely to be targeted…”  
Since larger markets are more desirable from the franchisor’s perspective, they may be 
less likely to convert outlets in these locations in response to evidence of agency problems for 
several reasons. For instance, the number of buyers in a market is a well-known determinant of 
demand (McConnell, Brue, & Flynn, 2009) and, in some larger markets, sales volume may be 
less dependent on product quality (Arrow, 1963). In other words, larger markets may include 
customers who are less sensitive to product or service quality (Grunert, 2005). Large markets 
may also possess certain amenities (e.g., interstate-highways, specialty retail centers, theme 
parks, etc.) that attract more transient business than repeat customers (Brickley & Dark, 1987). 
Lastly, franchisors may be less concerned with agency problems in large markets because some 
outlets serve alternative functions, such as training facilities, information gathering systems, or 
simply to increase visibility in critical locations (Smith, 1982). Therefore, I predict: 
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Hypothesis 3a: The local market’s population negatively moderates the relationship 
between company-outlet health violations and conversion to franchise, such that the 
relationship decreases as population increases. 
Number of Company-outlets As franchise systems grow, newly established outlets may 
change the composition of local markets. For example, as the number company-owned outlets 
(i.e., sister-units) increases in the local market, it should reduce the likelihood of converting a 
company-owned outlet to a franchise because the close proximity can help reduce the costs of 
monitoring (Carney & Gedajlovic, 1991). In other words, in the ex post setting, franchisors may 
be reluctant to convert restaurants with high violations when the density of company-owned 
outlets increases within a focal market area because the other outlets can provide monitoring and 
information sharing with the company. The efforts of managers at other outlets in the area may 
also help reduce the attrition of customers to competitors as customers choose to visit a sister 
outlet instead of going to a competitor.  
In addition, Michael (2002) showed that company-owned outlets were much better at 
coordinating price, quality, and advertising than their franchised counterparts. This is important 
because once a unit is franchised, it becomes its own entity and is protected by government 
regulations. Therefore, a franchised outlet cannot be forced to comply with corporate demands 
on price and advertising, whereas a company-owned outlet can. In this regard, because 
corporately owned and operated outlets are not constrained by antitrust issues, the coordination 
of price, quality, and advertising components may help the firm minimize the negative impact of 
agency problems at focal outlets. As the number of company-owned outlets in a focal market 
increases, monitoring costs are reduced and more information sharing channels are created. 
Because of this, firms will be less inclined to act upon persistent agency problems  
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Hypothesis 3b: The number of company-operated outlets in the local market negatively 
moderates the relationship between company-outlet health violations and conversion to 
franchise, such that the relationship decreases as the number of company-outlets 
increases. 
Outlet Characteristics 
 Distance Monitoring costs have long been considered a determinant of franchise choice 
(Combs & Ketchen, 2003). Outlet dispersion and distance from monitoring personnel (e.g., 
headquarters or neighboring outlets) are considered costly because of the number of monitoring 
agents needed and their associated travel costs (Carney & Gedajlovic, 1991). Although these 
factors play a role in the initial franchise choice decision, they may also have a significant impact 
on decisions made ex post. For instance, though headquarter locations are assumed to remain 
stable over time, initial decisions to expand the geographic boundaries of company-owned 
outlets into more distant markets may, retrospectively, result in excessively costly monitoring. 
This occurs because decision making in local markets often requires knowledge of local settings, 
which increases the difficulty and cost of franchisors to assess outlet managers (Minkler, 1990).  
As employee-managers of company-owned restaurants do not bear the full cost of 
shirking and the taking of perquisites, they will have greater incentive to engage in such behavior 
(Brickley & Dark, 1987). This behavior can detract from customer experience in local markets 
and spillover to other outlets in the chain. Furthermore, because information is difficult to 
synthesize and transfer, employee-managers may be less inclined to put for the effort to convey 




To summarize, it is likely that greater distance between a focal outlet and its monitoring 
agents makes it more difficult and costly to monitor and, thus, will have an impact on the 
appraisal of a problem outlet and its conversion to a franchise. That is, monitoring distance may 
emphasize the franchisor’s inability to effectively manage those outlets that are further from 
headquarters, as well as the need for more incentivized operators with a higher degree of local 
market knowledge. Therefore, in the ex post setting, company-outlets experiencing greater 
violations that are located farther from monitoring personnel should be more likely to be 
converted to a franchise. Stated formally: 
Hypothesis 4: The company-outlet’s distance from monitoring headquarters positively 
moderates the relationship between company-outlet health violations and conversion to 
franchise, such that the relationship increases as distance increases. 







IV. SAMPLE AND METHOD 
Empirical Setting: The Fast-Food Industry 
I chose the fast-food industry as a research context because of its robust association with 
the use of franchising. In fact, the fast-food segment is the most common franchising segment in 
the U.S., making up nearly 20% of total franchise establishments (Bailey, 2016). This setting is 
also important because it contributes greatly to the U.S. economy, as food and beverage related 
jobs totaled over 5.1 million across the U.S. in 2016 (Bls.gov, 2018a). Furthermore, in order to 
serve the general public, fast-food restaurants are required by the U.S. government to have 
annual health code inspections conducted by state regulatory officials. As such, annual health 
code inspections report non-compliance with established sanitation and food-safety laws, 
offering public observers an opportunity to evaluate safety standards at each restaurant. In the 
food-service industry, establishing and maintaining minimum health standards is important to 
firm survival (Bernstein & Sheen, 2016).  
Data and Samples 
The sample used to test the hypotheses consists of nine large fast-food restaurant chains 
operating both franchise and company outlets in the state of Florida between the years of 2003-
2016. As the third largest food service employing state in the U.S. (behind California and Texas), 
Florida’s food segment employs approximately 228,350 people (Bls.gov, 2018b). With a 
location quotient of 1.14, the ratio of the area concentration of occupational employment to the 
national average concentration, Florida has a higher share of food employment than the national 
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average, revealing the economic impact of the industry in the state, as well as the relevance and 
generalizability of the sample. Therefore, Florida’s detailed database of fast-food restaurants 
provides an excellent sampling context for testing the hypotheses. Previous studies have used 
similar samples. For example, Kalnins and Lafontaine (2004) used a cross-sectional sample of 
individual restaurants among seven major national food chains across the state of Texas, while 
Perryman and Combs (2012) a cross-sectional sample of sixteen restaurant chains within the 
state of Florida.  
The chains used in this study are considered to be the top competitors across the fast-food 
industry (QSR magazine, 2019), namely Arby’s, Burger King, Domino’s Pizza, Kentucky Fried 
Chicken, Pizza Hut, McDonald’s, Papa John’s Pizza, Taco Bell, and Wendy’s. Furthermore, 
these chains are also top competitors in their specific product offerings (e.g., burgers and 
sandwiches, pizza, Mexican, and chicken) and represent a good mix of product substitutes 
available in most markets. A total of 1220 company-operated restaurants were sampled, equating 
to approximately 10.5% of the average number of fast-food restaurants in the state of Florida 
between 2009 and 2014 (Ers.usda.gov, 2019). Table 1 describes the distribution of company-
operated outlets in the sample according to franchise chain.  
 Data were collected from multiple archival sources, including: The Department of 
Business and Professional Regulation (DBPR), annual reports, The Wall Street Journal, Bond’s 
Franchise Guide and COMPUSTAT. For example, outlet-level data were collected from The 
Department of Business and Professional Regulation (DBPR), specifically, the State of Florida 
Division of Hotels and Restaurants, an agency charged with the licensing and regulation of 
businesses and professionals in the State of Florida.  Florida’s state government re-established 
the Office of Open Government by executive order 11-03, providing public access to 
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government meetings and records. Information is recorded for each restaurant and reported at the 
county level, including the count and severity of health code violations, outlet location, and 
licensee information. Data between the years of 2002 to 2012 categorized health code violations 
into two types: critical or non-critical. Critical violations are identified by an asterisk (*) next to 
the violation on the inspection report. In March, 2004, the division began the process of 
identifying ‘risk factors’ as critical violations, however, they note that previous reports (i.e., 
those in the current year and prior to 2004) have been adjusted to reflect the standards at that 
time. Risk factors are denoted by a cross (†) symbol and are defined by the FDA as behaviors 
and preparation practices in retail and food service establishments that contribute to foodborne 
illness.  
 On January 1, 2013, following recommendations by the FDA, the Florida Division of 
Hotels and Restaurants adopted provisions of the 2009 FDA Food Code. A key change to the 
Food Code was the adoption of a new three-tiered violation classification that replaced the 
‘critical’ or ‘non-critical’ classification. The new system uses the terms ‘High Priority,’ 
‘Intermediate’ and ‘Basic’ to better define violation information. The numbering system of 
violations remains relatively the same, however, each violation contains several detailed citations 
that may include any or all of the three-tiered priorities. Risk factors are still denoted by the cross 
(†) symbol, however, the asterisk (*) now denotes good retail practices considered to be a 
primary concern that must be corrected immediately.  
 Company-operated outlet patterns were identified for chains exhibiting both forms of 
governance (corporate and franchised outlets) using licensee mailing addresses (Kalnins & 
Lafontaine, 2004).  For example, while Chipotle Mexican Grill is a prominent competitor in the 
quick service restaurant industry, currently it does not franchise its restaurants, whereas Subway 
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restaurants are nearly 100% franchised according to their 2017 franchise disclosure document. 
Because franchisors may establish new company-operated outlets over the sampling period, the 
panel of observations are not balanced. Regardless, the number of company-operated outlets 
observed over the sampling period is 8,296. Remaining data were collected from a variety of 
secondary sources, including annual reports, periodicals, trade-magazines, and COMPUSTAT.   
Dependent Variable  
Ownership conversion is operationalized as a change in the ownership status of a focal 
outlet. In particular, the conversion of outlet ownership from a company-operated outlet to 
franchisee-operated outlet. To capture this event, I coded for a change in the address of 
ownership on record. The Florida restaurant data present three different addresses: site location, 
licensee address, and mailing address. The site location typically remains constant since it 
represents the physical location of the focal restaurant, however, the licensee and mailing 
addresses are associated with the restaurant’s current operator. For example, McDonald’s 
requires franchisees to have a location for business operations that is separate from the 
restaurant’s physical location (J. Sells, personal communication, November 14, 2017). Licensee 
address changes that no longer matched with mailing addresses of corporate headquarters or 
regional offices were coded as being converted to a franchise.  
 Independent Variables 
 Outlet health violation. Outlet-level agency problems were operationalized using the 
Florida state health-code violations found in food service public records for each outlet. Because 
inspection standards and the violation classification system changed during the sampling 
timeframe it was necessary to create a variable that captures the risk factors reported under both 
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classification systems. To do so, I matched the 58 violation names for both sets of data, which 
were virtually identical, with the only changes being that some items were no longer being used 
and the cross (†) and asterisk (*) notations being changed for four of the 58 violations. In order 
to capture risk factors and critical violations, I combined the violations denoted by the cross (†) 
and asterisk (*) in both sampling timeframes (2002-2012 and 2013-2016). Therefore, outlet 
violations are operationalized as the sum of all violations, from either sampling timeframe, 
denoted by a cross (†) or an asterisk (*) for a reported inspection year. Furthermore, because 
initial inspection findings may require follow-up inspections or can be prompted by consumer 
complaints, the data can include multiple inspections per outlet per year. In this case, only 
inspections classified as “Routine – Food” were used. However, when multiple inspections under 
this classification type are reported in the same year, the violation results are summed to capture 
the added risk assumed to be associated with the focal outlet. Lastly, I computed a two-year 
moving average of these violations to capture the persistence of agency problems.  
Franchise visibility. For the moderating independent variables, I followed earlier 
research using the number of times the chain was mentioned in The Wall Street Journal over the 
period of study as media visibility (Deephouse, 2000; Dimov, Shepherd, & Sutcliffe, 2007; 
Phillipe & Durand, 2011). Since the sample is comprised of large, national restaurant chains, The 
Wall Street Journal (WSJ) was used in place of local newspapers because its news coverage 
tends to focus on the corporation (i.e., chain) as opposed to specific local outlets, as would be the 
case for Florida-based media outlets. Using the ProQuest database, I searched the WSJ for each 
franchise chain’s brand name (e.g., Burger King) between the years of 2003 and 2016. Excluding 
advertisements, there were 1162 total news-related mentions of the sampled chains across the 
sampling period.  
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Royalty rates. Royalty rates were taken from Bond’s Franchise Guide and annual reports. 
Bond’s Franchise Guide and annual reports are yearly publications that provide detailed 
information on each franchisor.  
Market size. was measured as the population of the county in which the focal outlet was 
physically located. The Bureau of Economic and Business Research, and in particular the 
Population Studies Program at the University of Florida, provides county-level population 
estimates and census data for the state of Florida.  
Number of company-outlets. The number of company-owned outlets within a market was 
calculated by counting the number of same-brand company-operated outlets within a county for 
a given year.  
Distance to the headquarter. Distance to the monitoring headquarters was created by 
taking the geographic distance between the focal outlet and the nearest monitoring headquarters. 
To get the geographic location (i.e., latitude and longitude) for each outlet, I first used the 
geocoding services provided by Texas A&M Geoservices, which takes physical address 
information and converts each observation into corresponding latitude and longitude. Monitoring 
headquarters addresses for each chain were then entered to get their corresponding latitude and 
longitude. Using the Stata command geodist, I calculated the distance between each outlet and its 
corresponding monitoring center3. The geodist command computes geodetic distances, or more 
plainly, the length of the shortest curve between two points along the surface of a mathematical 
model of the earth (Fmbc.edu, 2019).   
Control Variables 
                                                 
3 All independent variables were centered in the analysis.  
37 
 
To control for alternative explanations, I include variables related to franchisor resources 
and performance, economic condition, and outlet characteristics. For example, the resource 
scarcity perspective suggests that as franchise systems grow, access to once constrained 
resources is improved leading to a decrease in the use of franchising (Oxenfeldt & Kelley, 1968). 
A similar argument is made for the age of the franchise system. Therefore, I control for system 
age by the number of years the firm has been franchising. Chain performance fluctuations may 
impact a number of decisions; therefore, I used the previous year’s return on assets as a proxy for 
performance. Economic conditions may also influence a number of actions taken by franchisors. 
Within the sampling period, the U.S. experienced a number of economic events. To control for 
these effects, I created a dummy variable for each year. Similarly, though many of the chains in 
the sample are similar in their offerings and strategies, each franchise chain may have cultures, 
routines or other unique characteristics that are unobservable in the sample. To account for these 
effects, I include a dummy variable for each chain. Some franchise chains consist of multiple 
brands (e.g., YUM Brands! controls franchising rights for KFC, Pizza Hut, and Taco Bell). 
Because of their complexity, multi-branded franchisors may be less sensitive to the negative 
effects of agency problems at outlets compared to their single-branded counterparts, therefore, I 
control for multi-brand by using a dummy variable for multi-branded firms. 
Research in franchising suggests that larger outlets require increased managerial skill, a 
provision better accommodated by the franchisor (Kehoe, 1996).  Moreover, larger outlets are 
assumed to be associated with increased agent risk because of greater investment cost and 
managerial complexity (Brickley & Dark, 1987; Lafontaine & Slade, 2007). Because franchisors 
may be less likely to transfer large company-operated outlets to franchisees, I control for outlet 
size by using a dummy variable indicating whether the outlet offers seating or not. Lastly, many 
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of the outlets in the sample existed prior to the sampling period. The tenure of this group is 
partially known since the agency responsible for maintaining the database began doing so in 
1997. Because the actual age of this cohort of outlets is unknown, I partially control for these 
effects by including a dummy variable indicating incumbent outlets prior to the sampling period.  
Method 
Logistic regression is used to analyze the data. Logit model is a type of generalized linear 
model used for modeling which of two alternatives occurs (Hoetker, 2004), which is appropriate 
here since the dependent variable is an indicator variable noting the occurrence of a particular 
event – conversion of ownership. For instance, Hypothesis 1 argues that focal company-outlet 
violations increase the probability that ownership conversion occurs. While a company may have 
some baseline propensity to convert the ownership of its outlets, we often cannot observe this 
propensity but only the actual choice to convert, giving a value of 1 when an outlet is converted 
and 0 when it is not. By comparison, ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates would be biased 
(Wooldridge, 2015), because OLS may result in predictions outside the 0 to 1 range. Logit model 
resolves this issue by fitting a nonlinear function to the data and limiting the boundaries of the 
dependent variable between 0 and 1 (Cameron & Trivedi, 2010).  
When interpreting logistic regression coefficients, a positive coefficient suggests that the 
probability of converting an outlet increases with violations, though, interpreting the magnitude 
of the effect is less intuitive (Wooldridge, 2015). However, for a more intuitive interpretation, 
the estimate can be converted to an odds ratio. When reporting results, the odds ratio, their 
standard errors, and the value of the log likelihood function should be included. Such estimates 
indicate the sign of each predictor variable on the outcome probability, the statistical significance 
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of the estimate determines the predictability of the variable, and the pseudo-R2 is comparable to 
the R2 from linear probability models, though this statistic should be interpreted with caution.  
To test the interactions, logit models can be more complicated to interpret. For instance, 
unlike OLS, in which the researcher interprets the coefficient of the interaction term, interpreting 
the marginal effect of an interaction between two variables in a logit model requires more input 
from the researcher. An example of this input would be to interpret the interaction at 
theoretically interesting points, like the mean, median, or relevant quartiles. Therefore, to 
analyze the interaction terms, I follow best practice recommendations prescribed by Hoetker 
(2007), which include specifying the model with the interaction terms, assessing the interactions 
at specific values, and providing figures of each.  
Supplementary Analyses 
 I conducted several supplementary analyses as robustness checks of the main analysis. 
Though the initial model is an effort for parsimony, it is important to examine the potential effect 
of other explanations. Therefore, I include additional control variables that may affect chain 
decision making processes and assess the sensitivity of the main findings to alternative 
explanations. Next, I analyze agency problems in company-outlets using an alternative proxy for 
agency problems. This variable captures the number of annual inspections rather than the number 
of violations at the focal outlet. Lastly, I use alternative statistical analyses and exclude chains 









As noted in Table 1, there are 1,220 unique restaurant outlets represented across the 
sampling period. Figure 2 illustrates the number of company-owned outlets among the nine 
brands throughout the sample period. Figure 2 suggests that the nine firms sampled have 
differing tendencies toward the use of company-owned outlets across time. For example, 
McDonald’s appears to increase the number of company-operated outlets between 2007 and 
2009, while KFC and Pizza Hut reduce their number of company-operated outlets around this 
time.  
Although Figure 2 provides a summary of the number of company-operated outlets 
during the sampling period, it does not clearly illustrate the number of outlets that were 
converted to franchises. Therefore, Figures 3 and 4 show the distribution of company-owned 
outlets that were converted per year and by each brand. In Figure 3, observe the difference 
between the seemingly stable rates of conversion between 2003 and 2008 compared to the drastic 
changes in the following years. One explanation for this change in outlet-level activity is the 
changing economic conditions in the U.S. during this time. Perhaps fast-food chains convert 
company-operated outlets during tough economic times in order to shed risk or to increase cash 
holdings. Interestingly, Figure 4 shows that fast-food chains also have heterogeneous preferences 
for converting company-outlets to franchises. For example, during the sampling period, Pizza 
Hut converted slightly more than 7 times the number of outlets than Domino’s Pizza and over 5 
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times the number of Papa John’s. One notable difference among these particular brands is that 
Pizza Hut is the only restaurant with a dining room, as Domino’s Pizza and Papa John’s are 
predominantly take-out service. Nevertheless, these graphs provide evidence that the restaurant 
chains sampled here have heterogeneous preferences for converting company-operated outlets 
and that these tendencies may be sensitive to conditions outside the firm as well.  
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics and a correlation matrix on the variables included in 
the analysis. The table shows that the number of Sister outlets and Population are correlated 
rather highly at 0.60. Though the strength of this relationship makes sense given that franchisors 
may choose to put multiple company-owned outlets in areas with large populations, highly 
correlated variables can raise questions about multicollinearity. Therefore, variance inflation 
factors (VIF) were calculated for the model (Powell & Rhee, 2016). All of the VIF values were 
below the thresholds suggested in the literature (i.e., 10 and 4; O’Brien, 2007; Xu, Pan, & 
Beamish, 2004)4 and as later supplemental analyses show, there were no drastic shifts in the 
estimates with or without those variables in the models.  
 Table 3 presents the results of the logistic regression models used to test the hypotheses. 
Model 1 includes the control variables, which shows that chain age (β = 0.151, p< .001) and 
prior performance (β = 1.808, p< .001) have positive and significant effects on company-
operated outlet conversion. Similarly, outlet size (β = 0.327, p< .05) and media visibility (β = 
0.073, p< .001) are both positive and significant in relation to outlet conversion. Conversely, 
multi-branded chains (β = -3.289, p< .001) and the number of sister outlets (β = -0.046, p< .001) 
in the market are negatively and significantly related to outlet conversion. However, outlet 
incumbency, royalty rate, market size, and outlet distance to headquarters are not significant. 
                                                 
4 The VIF test used was the collin test in STATA 14.   
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  Model 2 investigates the association of outlet food and health violations and the 
likelihood that an outlet will be converted to a franchise. This coefficient is positive and 
significant (β = 0.042, p< 0.001), supporting Hypothesis 1. In terms of odds, this result suggests 
that for an additional unit increase in average outlet violations, the odds that an outlet will be 
converted to a franchise increases by 1.043 times. This result is fairly robust as it holds through 
each of the model specifications.  
Models 3 through 7 test the hypothesized interactions. Recall that Hypothesis 2 predicted 
that firm visibility, operationalized by the number of times a chain appeared in the Wall Street 
Journal in the previous year, would reduce the positive effect of outlet violations on the 
likelihood of outlet conversion. Interestingly, this coefficient is marginally significant but in the 
opposite direction predicted (β= 0.001, p<0.10), therefore, Hypothesis 2 is not supported. 
However, this finding suggests that firms with greater visibility may be more likely to convert 
problem outlets than their less visible counterparts. Figure 5 illustrates this interaction effect by 
depicting how a one standard deviation increase in firm visibility (i.e., high visibility) increases 
the positive relationship between outlet violations and outlet conversion.  
 Model 4 tests Hypothesis 3, which posits that higher royalty rates reduce the positive 
relationship between outlet violations and outlet conversion. This hypothesis was supported (β = 
-0.025, p<0.05), suggesting that chains with higher royalties are less likely to convert company 
outlets in response to increased agency problems. More specifically, with outlet violations at the 
sample mean, a one-unit increase in royalty rate changes the multiplicative factor of agency 
problems on the odds of outlet conversion by a factor of 0.975, or a 2.5% reduction in odds. 
Figure 6 illustrates this by depicting how a one standard deviation increase in royalty rate 
decreases the likelihood that an outlet will be converted. Hypothesis 4 (Model 5) posits that 
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market size, operationalized as county population, will reduce the positive relationship between 
outlet violations and outlet conversion. This hypothesis was not supported as the coefficient is in 
the opposite direction and is not statistically significant. Hypothesis 5 predicted that the number 
of sister-outlets in the local market would reduce the relationship between outlet violations and 
outlet conversion. Model 6 fails to find support for this argument, as the estimate is in the 
opposite direction predicted and is not significant.  
 Hypothesis 6 predicts that greater distance between an outlet and its chain headquarters 
will increase the positive relationship between outlet violations and conversion. Interestingly, 
and contrary to existing literature on ex ante franchise choice (e.g., Brickley & Dark, 1987), the 
data do not support this argument. Instead, this estimate is opposite of prediction and significant 
(β = -0.011, p<0.001), suggesting that greater distance between an outlet and its monitoring 
headquarters decreases the relationship between outlet violations and conversion. More 
specifically, with outlet violations at the sample mean, a one-unit increase in distance (i.e., 100 
miles) changes the multiplicative factor of agency problems on the odds of outlet conversion by 
a factor of 0.989, or a 1.1% reduction in odds. Figure 7 illustrates this interaction effect by 
depicting how a one standard deviation increase in distance decreases the likelihood that an 
outlet will be converted. Table 4 summarizes the results of hypotheses testing.  
Supplementary Analysis 
To check the sensitivity of the results, I first include three additional variables that may 
influence the choice of franchise chains to convert. Because the agency variable in this study is 
constructed by summing the number of violations for each annual inspection, I include annual 
inspection count as an additional control. Second, I also control for notable events at the chain 
level. For example, some of the sampled restaurant chains experienced corporate ownership 
changes, new partnerships, initial public offerings, or announced strategic intent to change their 
44 
 
existing franchise mix (i.e., the number of franchised outlets to total outlets). Because, for 
various reasons, these events can impact changes in chain structure, I account for this by 
including a dummy variable for such events. Lastly, I include an additional control variable to 
test the sensitivity of Hypothesis 2 – chain media visibility – to article sentiment. The initial 
analysis presented in Table 2 takes a general approach to media visibility (e.g., the number of 
times the chain is mentioned in the WSJ in the previous year). However, articles in the Wall 
Street Journal can be negative or positive in nature. To account for this potential issue, I include 
a variable for the percentage of positive articles for each chain per year. To do so, I took the 
number of positive articles for each chain in a given year and divided by the total number of 
articles per chain for that year5. Table 5 contains the results of the supplemental analysis, which 
remains largely unchanged from the main analysis. For example, the directionality of the 
relationships and odds estimates remain virtually the same.  
Next, in place of the two-year moving average of outlet violations used in the main 
analysis, I reran each model using annual inspection count to show the robustness of the results 
to alternative proxies for agency problems (see Table 6). The main effect argument that outlet 
violations increase the likelihood of outlet conversion (i.e., Hypothesis 1), receives only marginal 
support, though the estimate is in the predicted direction (β = 0.092, p<0.10). The remaining 
results are analogous to those in the main analysis, although Hypothesis 5 (Model 6) receives 
marginal support (β = -0.008, p<0.10).   
Lastly, because some franchise chains experienced greater changes in the number of 
company-owned restaurants during the sampling period, I reran the main analysis dropping these 
                                                 
5 Results are analogous when simply using the number of positive and negative articles in the model.  
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chains. Specifically, Table 7 shows the results of the logistic regression without Pizza Hut in the 
sample. Results are similar to those of the full sample with the exception of the interaction 
between media visibility and outlet violations, which is in the same direction but is no longer 
significant.  
Additionally, many of the outlets in the sample existed prior to the sampling period. This 
limits the usefulness of the Cox regression model because the actual ages of these outlets are 
unknown and estimating the actual time to event would restrict the sample to those outlets with 
known ages, therefore, reducing the sample’s statistical power. To circumvent this limitation, I 
ran the model in two different specifications. In the analysis, I used both the samples with known 
start dates and those unknown. For the unknown, I arbitrarily generated a random start date 
between 1980 and 1997. Table 8 shows the results of these models. Violations appear to increase 
the hazard of outlet conversion, providing additional support for Hypothesis 1. Support for 
Hypotheses 2 and 6 are again in the opposite directions predicted but significant, however, 
Hypothesis 3 is no longer supported. 
Lastly, I explore alternative outcomes for the sampled outlets with additional post-hoc 
analyses. I originally suggested that persistent agency problems would ultimately lead to outlet 
closure but that conversion was a more desirable alternative because it enables the chain to 
continue to draw revenue from outlet operations, through franchise fees and royalties, while 
maintaining key metrics salient to stakeholders and observers (e.g., number of outlets, etc.). The 
sample data provide an opportunity to test this assumption by examining alternative tests among 
the outcomes of continuance – where the franchise chain allows the outlet to continue operating, 
conversion – where the outlet is converted to a franchise operation, and closure – where the 
outlet’s operation is completely terminated. To test these different outcomes, I use multinomial 
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logistic regression to predict the increase or decrease in the probability of an outcome relative to 
a specified base outcome. For instance, for outlets with greater violations the relative probability 
that the outlet is converted rather than allowed to continue is 4.2% higher. Interestingly, the 
relative probability of an outlet being closed rather than allowed to continue is nearly 15% lower 
for outlets with greater violations. When compared to closure as the baseline, franchisors are 
approximately 22.2% more likely to convert an outlet and 17% more likely to allow it to 
continue operating (see Table 9). These findings offer some support for my initial assumption 
that franchise chains prefer conversion over closure, however, these results are interesting 
because they suggest franchise chains may also face a dilemma when it comes to problematic 
outlets. Indeed, though problematic outlets may cause concern for the chain’s brand image and 
reputation, closing them completely may mean losing a market altogether. Instead, these results 
support the notion that franchisor’s allow outlets to continue operations when suitable conversion 








 Following the insights of a number of scholars (e.g., Dalton et al., 2007; Fama & Jensen, 
1983a, 1983b; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Kim & Mahoney, 2005), I began by noting that agency 
theory has been predominantly viewed from an ex ante perspective. For example, agency theory 
has vast literature describing both situations in which agency problems are likely to occur and 
the mechanisms used to mitigate such problems (Eisenhardt, 1989). This study aims to 
complement this body of research by extending agency-based arguments into the ex post setting 
and delineating boundary conditions under which owners attempt to remedy agency problems. In 
doing so, and through the use of a fast-food franchise chains, this study also makes an analogous 
contribution to the franchising literature by extending the discussion on franchise choice into the 
ex post setting and the boundary conditions affecting these decisions. Lastly, compared to 
previous studies in the franchise choice literature, the large panel and outlet-level data used in 
this study provides a finer level of detail to the dynamic structural changes occurring in large 
franchise systems over time.  
 One important finding is that persistent agency problems increase the likelihood of a 
change in business-unit management. Specifically, using a sample of fast-food restaurants, I 
predicted that increased health code violations at focal restaurants would lead to the conversion 
of those outlets to more incentivized managers (i.e., franchisees). Supplemental analyses and 
additional post-hoc tests revealed that franchisors are more apt to convert problem outlets rather 
than allowing them to continue or outright close them. Thus, the empirical evidence found in this 
study supports the validity of agency-based arguments in the ex post setting and establishes an 
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opportunity to expand theory beyond traditional ex ante mitigation. This is important because the 
ex post setting presents nuanced challenges for the firm to navigate compared to the ex ante 
setting and though these challenges include economic consequences, they go beyond traditional 
transaction cost arguments by illuminating potential concerns for signaling and social identity.  
 When investigating the boundary conditions for conversion as a mechanism for agency 
remediation, I argued that a number of chain-, market-, and outlet-level characteristics may 
weaken or strengthen the likelihood of this action. For example, I posited that a chain’s visibility 
would make it reluctant to unload poorly performing outlets because doing so may damage the 
relationship between potential franchisees and the franchisor. Contrary to this prediction, the 
results suggest that franchise visibility may actually increase the likelihood of converting 
problem outlets to more capable franchisees. One explanation for this result is that increased 
visibility drives demand for these outlets and that franchisees may, therefore, be less sensitive to 
outlet quality when the opportunity to be associated with the chain is available. Using a 
tournament theory perspective, Gillis et al. (2011) showed that franchisors often extend multiple 
outlets to franchisees that exceed operational expectations. Perhaps franchisors use the 
conversion of existing company-operated outlets as a similar tool and those that experience 
greater agency problems become prime candidates for such awards.  
 As predicted, royalty rates appear to reduce the relationship between violations and outlet 
conversion. In the ex ante setting, royalty rates are thought to signal the potential profitability of 
a chain’s brand (Gallini & Lutz, 1992). Therefore, for franchisors, royalty rates not only serve to 
drive demand for their outlets but, in turn, offer an economic incentive to franchise those outlets 
over company-operation. However, royalty rates can also signal the level of support that 
franchisees can expect from franchisors. Therefore, in the ex post setting, franchisors may be 
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reluctant to convert problem outlets given their existing knowledge of the outlet’s operation 
issues and the misalignment with the expectations of the franchisee for future support. 
Furthermore, because continued support of these outlets may become extensive and costly, 
franchisors should be less likely to convert in response to agency problems.  
The distance between an outlet and monitoring headquarters was hypothesized to 
increase the relationship between outlet violations and the likelihood of conversion. However, 
greater distance appears to weaken the odds of these outlets being converted. One explanation 
for this outcome could be the franchisor’s limitation in knowledge of local conditions and that 
maintaining ownership allows the organization to learn from continued operations. An 
alternative explanation is that these particular outlets serve the system in some other valued 
capacity such as training or market research facilities. Post-hoc analysis results find that outlets 
with higher violations located further from monitoring headquarters are at approximately 1.1% 
greater risk of continuance than of conversion (see Table 8; Violations x Distance), which may 
suggest the franchisor’s reluctance to convert a problematic store that will be costly to monitor.  
In sum, this study not only provides insight into agency theory’s reach beyond the ex ante 
mitigation of agency problems, it also illuminates the salience in the level of characteristics that 
place boundaries on that reach. Accordingly, the results of this study suggest that firm-level 
characteristics and outlet-level characteristics are important factors for franchisors when deciding 
to remedy agency problems at company-operated outlets. On one hand, greater media visibility 
helps to bolster demand for these outlets making it easier for more visible firms to justify 
converting problem outlets. On the other hand, higher royalty rates and monitoring distance of 
the outlet reduce the likelihood of converting problem outlets perhaps because these factors serve 
to increase the costs of support and monitoring beyond that of maintaining company-ownership. 
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In which case, free-riding of company-outlets on others in the system appears to be a more 
rational choice than choosing to reduce the agency problems through outlet conversion. 
Interestingly, market-level factors, at least those tested in this study, do not appear to play a 
significant role in ex post changes to outlet ownership. Perhaps these factors carry more weight 
when establishing new outlets (Perryman & Combs, 2012) and less on future changes.  
Limitations  
No study is without limitations. For instance, the generalizability of the results is 
restricted to the fast-food industry in Florida. Although Florida is one of the largest states for 
food service franchising, the findings presented here may be quite different across other states 
and industries which use franchising as a strategy. Future research should examine other 
franchising industries and the role industry plays in the relationship between ex post agency 
problems and ownership changes. Agency problems at focal restaurants were operationalized by 
health code violations conducted by state food and health regulation agents. Unfortunately, data 
regarding other proxies for agency problems (e.g., OSHA violations, hospitalizations due to 
food-borne illness, etc.) were limited at the outlet-level. Furthermore, health inspections are 
conducted by individual agents and because information for each agent was inaccessible, I could 
not control for this important explanation. Nevertheless, future research should attempt to test 
other measures reflecting agency problems and their consequences. There are a number of other 
interesting moderators that could be tested. For example, how chains determine outlet ownership 
during challenging economic conditions presents an interesting research opportunity. Lastly, 
three-way interactions may be a worthwhile endeavor given the multiple levels of interest in 
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Distribution of Sampled Company-Outlets by Franchise Chain 
     
 Franchise Chain # Outlets 
Percent of 
Sample  
 Arby's 70 5.74  
 Burger King 106 8.69  
 Domino's Pizza 76 6.23  
 Pizza Hut 232 19.02  
 Kentucky Fried Chicken 150 12.3  
 McDonald's 208 17.05  
 Papa John's 158 12.95  
 Taco Bell 126 10.33  
 Wendy's 94 7.7  


































Descriptive Statistics and Correlations of Variables in the Study 
 
 
Variable M SD Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
1 Convert to Franchise 0.06 0.24 0 1 -
2 Firm Age 49.08 12.58 19 77 0.06 -
3 Prior performance 0.24 0.13 0.01 0.65 0.06 0.13 -
4 Multibrand 0.46 0.50 0 1 0.06 0.38 -0.01 -
5 Outlet size 0.66 0.47 0 1 0.02 0.43 -0.39 0.14 -
6 Incumbent 0.55 0.50 0 1 0.01 0.02 0.08 -0.05 -0.07 -
7 Media visibility 9.50 13.36 0 61 -0.01 0.19 -0.13 -0.43 0.28 0.02 -
8 Royalty rate 4.97 1.60 4 12.5 0.00 -0.08 0.14 -0.01 -0.13 -0.15 0.27 -
9 Market size 13.73 0.91 9.58 14.79 -0.09 0.01 0.03 -0.05 0.04 -0.09 -0.15 -0.03 -
10 Sister outlets 13.78 11.74 1 51 -0.07 0.14 -0.06 -0.05 0.07 -0.20 -0.07 -0.03 0.60 -
11 Distance 9.27 5.40 0.002 23.07 0.05 -0.07 0.36 0.30 0.05 -0.01 -0.03 0.25 0.00 -0.28 -
12 Violations 6.23 5.01 0 56 0.07 0.22 0.10 0.03 0.07 0.07 0.18 -0.06 -0.26 -0.14 -0.01 -
13 Violations x Media visibilility 11.97 91.57 -454.06 2095.24 0.03 0.04 0.05 -0.15 0.06 0.10 0.32 -0.13 -0.20 -0.09 0.03 0.27 -
14 Violations x Royalty rate -0.51 7.51 -46.74 167.01 -0.01 -0.11 -0.05 0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.20 -0.10 0.09 0.08 -0.05 -0.19 -0.01 -
15 Violations x Market size -1.21 6.45 -168.92 18.84 -0.03 -0.13 0.01 0.09 -0.11 -0.06 -0.19 0.06 0.19 -0.02 0.05 -0.34 -0.47 0.20 -
16 Violations x Sisters -8.38 52.79 -510.63 720.39 0.03 -0.13 0.11 0.14 -0.15 0.03 -0.13 0.08 -0.04 -0.30 0.22 -0.11 -0.26 0.13 0.58 -
17 Violations x Distance -0.37 20.73 -127.13 176.97 -0.05 -0.03 -0.12 -0.20 -0.02 -0.05 0.04 -0.06 0.09 0.26 -0.37 -0.14 -0.02 0.28 0.09 -0.18































Logit Regression Predicting Outlet Conversion 





Interaction Term Models 
Full 
Model 
         
DV: Convert to franchise Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
          
Independent Variables                 
Constant -6.834*** -6.368*** -6.478*** -6.564*** -6.366*** -6.323*** -6.196*** -6.301*** 
 (1.826) (1.838) (1.846) (1.859) (1.839) (1.845) (1.851) (1.879) 
Firm age 0.151*** 0.148*** 0.151*** 0.153*** 0.148*** 0.147*** 0.145*** 0.150*** 
 (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.033) (0.034) 
Firm performance 1.808*** 1.804*** 1.790*** 1.793*** 1.805*** 1.810*** 1.899*** 1.896*** 
 (0.293) (0.294) (0.293) (0.293) (0.295) (0.295) (0.301) (0.302) 
Multi-brand -3.289*** -3.281*** -3.263*** -3.292*** -3.283*** -3.280*** -3.232*** -3.223*** 
 (0.444) (0.448) (0.447) (0.449) (0.448) (0.448) (0.452) (0.452) 
Outlet size 0.327* 0.273+ 0.285+ 0.311+ 0.271+ 0.271+ 0.292+ 0.302+ 
 (0.164) (0.162) (0.163) (0.165) (0.162) (0.162) (0.162) (0.165) 
Incumbent outlet 0.0777 0.0766 0.0646 0.0583 0.0779 0.0785 0.0832 0.0711 
 (0.108) (0.108) (0.109) (0.108) (0.108) (0.108) (0.109) (0.110) 
Year dummy Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Firm dummy  Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
WSJ appearances 0.0726*** 0.0760*** 1.000 0.0778*** 0.0758*** 0.0758*** 0.0769*** 0.0734*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.000) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) 
Royalty rate -0.177 -0.166 -0.159 -0.183 -0.165 -0.166 -0.166 -0.151 
 (0.190) (0.193) (0.192) (0.189) (0.193) (0.192) (0.193) (0.192) 
Population  -0.0483 -0.0333 -0.0257 -0.0350 -0.0410 -0.0398 -0.0370 -0.0782 













Table 3 (Continued) 
 
DV: Convert to franchise Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
         
Sister outlets -0.0463*** -0.0475*** -0.0474*** -0.0458*** -0.0472*** -0.0470*** -0.0453*** -0.0426*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Distance to HQ (100 mi) -0.0843 -0.0275 -0.0187 -0.00765 -0.0276 -0.0299 -0.0300 -0.0125 
 (0.075) (0.076) (0.075) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.077) (0.076) 
 
  (0.000)     (0.001) 
Violations x Royalty    -0.0252*    -0.0059 
 
  
 (0.011)    (0.015) 
Violations x Population     0.0023   0.0130 
 
  
  (0.006)   (0.009) 
Violations x Sisters      0.0005  0.0004 
 
  
   (0.001)  (0.001) 
Violations x Distance       -0.0111*** -0.0113*** 
              (0.003) (0.003) 
         
log-likelihood -1427.4 -1419.8 -1418.4 -1417.1 -1419.7 -1419.6 -1411.4 -1408.4 
χ2 535.2 524.7 523.5 522.8 524.6 526.3 520.4 523.0 
N 8296 8296 8296 8296 8296 8296 8296 8296 
                  
Standard errors in parentheses        

































Summary of Results 
 
Variables Key Finding 
H1 - Violations (2 yr mov. avg.) 
Persistent health code violations increase the probability of company-operated outlets being 
converted to a franchise. 
H2 - Violations x Media visibility 
Contrary to prediction, franchisor media visibility appears to strengthen the positive 
relationship between company-outlet violations and conversion to franchise, though this result 
is only marginally supported.  
H3 - Violations x Royalty rate 
Consistent with prediction, higher franchisor royalty rates reduce the positive relationship 
between company-outlet violations and conversion to franchise. 
H4 - Violations x Market size Not supported 
H5 - Violations x Sister outlets Not supported 
H6 - Violations x Outlet distance 
Contrary to prediction, the distance between company-operated outlet and monitoring 
headquarters reduces the positive relationship between company-outlet violations and 
































Logit Regression Predicting Outlet Conversion with Additional Controls 
                  
 Controls Main Effects Interaction Term Models Full Model 
         
DV: Convert to franchise Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
          
Independent Variables                 
Constant -8.904*** -8.269*** -8.316*** -8.498*** -8.270*** -8.221*** -8.182*** -8.211*** 
 (1.860) (1.866) (1.868) (1.887) (1.866) (1.872) (1.874) (1.900) 
Positive media -0.515** -0.514** -0.512** -0.516** -0.513** -0.517** -0.578** -0.568** 
 (0.190) (0.189) (0.189) (0.189) (0.189) (0.189) (0.186) (0.186) 
Annual inspections 0.123* 0.0407 0.0320 0.0410 0.0417 0.0425 0.0518 0.0486 
 (0.052) (0.057) (0.058) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) 
Corporate event 1.487*** 1.521*** 1.503*** 1.538*** 1.520*** 1.514*** 1.583*** 1.545*** 
 (0.415) (0.423) (0.418) (0.428) (0.423) (0.422) (0.438) (0.431) 
Firm age 0.168*** 0.164*** 0.166*** 0.169*** 0.164*** 0.163*** 0.162*** 0.166*** 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036) 
Firm performance 1.882*** 1.885*** 1.873*** 1.874*** 1.886*** 1.893*** 2.003*** 2.001*** 
 (0.315) (0.315) (0.314) (0.312) (0.315) (0.316) (0.325) (0.325) 
Multi-brand -3.186*** -3.169*** -3.152*** -3.179*** -3.172*** -3.168*** -3.096*** -3.091*** 
 (0.445) (0.447) (0.446) (0.448) (0.447) (0.447) (0.450) (0.451) 
Outlet size 0.310+ 0.268+ 0.279+ 0.306+ 0.266+ 0.265+ 0.287+ 0.297+ 
 (0.164) (0.161) (0.162) (0.164) (0.161) (0.161) (0.161) (0.164) 
Incumbent outlet 0.0853 0.0832 0.0717 0.0651 0.0843 0.0854 0.0918 0.0804 
 (0.107) (0.108) (0.108) (0.108) (0.108) (0.108) (0.109) (0.109) 
Year dummy Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 












Table 5 (continued) 
DV: Convert to franchise Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
WSJ appearances 0.0736*** 0.0765*** 1.000 0.0782*** 0.0763*** 0.0763*** 0.0775*** 0.0743*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.000) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) 
Royalty rate -0.152 -0.142 -0.136 -0.157 -0.142 -0.142 -0.139 -0.126 
 (0.191) (0.193) (0.192) (0.190) (0.193) (0.193) (0.194) (0.193) 
Population  -0.0375 -0.0327 -0.0259 -0.0339 -0.0391 -0.0399 -0.0351 -0.0757 
 (0.086) (0.085) (0.086) (0.086) (0.088) (0.087) (0.086) (0.088) 
Sister outlets -0.0470*** -0.0483*** -0.0482*** -0.0466*** -0.0480*** -0.0477*** -0.0460*** -0.0433*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Distance to HQ (100 mi) -0.0723 -0.0279 -0.0193 -0.00767 -0.0281 -0.0309 -0.0313 -0.0145 
 (0.075) (0.076) (0.076) (0.077) (0.076) (0.076) (0.077) (0.077) 
Violations (2 yr mov. avg)  0.0384*** 0.0344** 0.0312** 0.0399** 0.0391*** 0.0335** 0.0371** 
  (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013) 
Violations x WSJ   0.0008+     0.001 
   (0.000)     (0.001) 
Violations x Royalty    -0.0254*    -0.0061 
    (0.011)    (0.015) 
Violations x Population     0.00192   0.0124 
     (0.006)   (0.010) 
Violations x Sisters      0.000580  0.0005 
      (0.001)  (0.001) 
Violations x Distance       -0.0121*** -0.0122*** 
              (0.003) (0.003) 
         
log-likelihood -1420.1 -1414.8 -1413.5 -1412.0 -1414.7 -1414.6 -1405.0 -1402.3 
χ2 526.4 519.9 518.8 518.1 520.0 521.8 514.0 518.6 
N 8296 8296 8296 8296 8296 8296 8296 8296 
                  
Standard errors in parentheses        













Logit Regression Predicting Outlet Conversion with Number of Annual Inspections 





Interaction Term Models 
Full 
Model 
         
DV: Convert to franchise Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
          
Independent Variables                 
Constant -5.639** -6.314** -6.069** -5.964** -6.329** -6.404** -6.233** -6.045** 
 (2.093) (2.126) (2.117) (2.131) (2.131) (2.134) (2.126) (2.136) 
Firm age 0.150*** 0.156*** 0.152*** 0.153*** 0.156*** 0.157*** 0.153*** 0.151*** 
 (0.032) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) 
Firm performance 1.780*** 1.766*** 1.768*** 1.762*** 1.765*** 1.761*** 1.800*** 1.809*** 
 (0.251) (0.251) (0.249) (0.247) (0.250) (0.251) (0.252) (0.252) 
Multi-brand -2.761*** -2.769*** -2.761*** -2.863*** -2.774*** -2.770*** -2.793*** -2.797*** 
 (0.400) (0.401) (0.401) (0.410) (0.401) (0.401) (0.407) (0.412) 
Outlet size 0.305* 0.300* 0.305* 0.317* 0.300* 0.301* 0.312* 0.325* 
 (0.145) (0.146) (0.145) (0.146) (0.146) (0.146) (0.146) (0.146) 
Incumbent outlet 0.127 0.130 0.124 0.126 0.129 0.129 0.139 0.134 
 (0.099) (0.099) (0.099) (0.099) (0.099) (0.099) (0.099) (0.099) 
Year dummy Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Firm dummy  Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
WSJ appearances 0.0646*** 0.0647*** 0.0647*** 0.0674*** 0.0648*** 0.0647*** 0.0665*** 0.0670*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Royalty rate -0.268 -0.269 -0.277 -0.335 -0.268 -0.270 -0.267 -0.264 
 (0.252) (0.253) (0.251) (0.255) (0.254) (0.254) (0.253) (0.252) 
Population  0.0338 0.0415 0.0459 0.0447 0.0444 0.0501 0.0425 0.0380 












Table 6 (continued) 
DV: Convert to franchise Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Sister outlets -0.0580*** -0.0579*** -0.0585*** -0.0576*** -0.0581*** -0.0594*** -0.0575*** -0.0581*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Distance to HQ (100 mi) -0.0762 -0.0680 -0.0542 -0.0541 -0.0677 -0.0676 -0.0756 -0.0579 
 (0.072) (0.072) (0.071) (0.071) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) 
Violations (Annual 
Inspections)  0.0923+ 0.0477 0.0502 0.0832+ 0.0605 0.114* 0.0593 
  (0.047) (0.049) (0.046) (0.049) (0.051) (0.047) (0.051) 
Violations x WSJ   0.00736**     0.00585* 
   (0.002)     (0.003) 
Violations x Royalty    -0.198***    -0.0851 
    (0.050)    (0.061) 
Violations x Population     -0.0182   0.0928* 
     (0.037)   (0.045) 
Violations x Sisters      -0.00833+  -0.0119+ 
      (0.005)  (0.006) 
Violations x Distance       -0.0264** -0.0226* 
              (0.008) (0.009) 
         
log-likelihood -1682.1 -1680.4 -1676 -1673.6 -1680.3 -1679.3 -1676.5 -1669.6 
χ2 584.0 582.0 584.6 578.1 581.1 584.8 570.5 588.4 
N 9551 9551 9551 9551 9551 9551 9551 9551 
                  
Standard errors in parentheses        
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001       















Logit Regression Predicting Outlet Conversion without Pizza Hut 
                  
 Controls Main Effects Interaction Term Models Full Model 
         
DV: Convert to franchise Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
          
Independent Variables                 
Constant -3.743* -3.200+ -3.376+ -3.761* -3.206+ -3.171+ -3.206+ -3.565+ 
 (1.865) (1.882) (1.892) (1.901) (1.882) (1.883) (1.903) (1.938) 
Firm age 0.0794* 0.0752* 0.0787* 0.0810* 0.0752* 0.0750* 0.0755* 0.0819* 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
Firm performance 1.973*** 1.960*** 1.945*** 1.933*** 1.960*** 1.962*** 2.054*** 1.998*** 
 (0.297) (0.296) (0.295) (0.292) (0.296) (0.296) (0.306) (0.308) 
Multi-brand -2.306*** -2.264*** -2.250*** -2.353*** -2.263*** -2.264*** -2.245*** -2.295*** 
 (0.462) (0.463) (0.463) (0.470) (0.464) (0.463) (0.468) (0.470) 
Outlet size 0.504+ 0.479+ 0.475+ 0.505+ 0.480+ 0.476+ 0.512+ 0.502+ 
 (0.273) (0.272) (0.272) (0.274) (0.272) (0.272) (0.272) (0.274) 
Incumbent outlet 0.238+ 0.227+ 0.218 0.220+ 0.227+ 0.227+ 0.241+ 0.226+ 
 (0.132) (0.133) (0.134) (0.134) (0.133) (0.133) (0.135) (0.135) 
Year dummy Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 












Table 7 (continued) 
DV: Convert to franchise Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
WSJ appearances 0.0514*** 0.0543*** 1.000 0.0568*** 0.0544*** 0.0543*** 0.0556*** 0.0532*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.000) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) 
Royalty rate -0.210 -0.199 -0.190 -0.483** -0.199 -0.199 -0.198 -0.284* 
 (0.144) (0.146) (0.145) (0.153) (0.146) (0.146) (0.149) (0.116) 
Population  -0.0658 -0.0502 -0.0422 -0.0537 -0.0466 -0.0561 -0.0546 -0.0859 
 (0.088) (0.087) (0.088) (0.088) (0.091) (0.090) (0.088) (0.090) 
Sister outlets -0.0627*** -0.0628*** -0.0633*** -0.0628*** -0.0630*** -0.0618*** -0.0605*** -0.0594*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Distance to HQ (100 mi) -0.0251 0.0384 0.0413 0.0487 0.0382 0.0387 0.0324 0.0461 
 (0.081) (0.081) (0.081) (0.082) (0.081) (0.081) (0.082) (0.082) 
Violations (2 yr. mov. avg)  0.0471*** 0.0370** -0.0318 0.0461*** 0.0501*** 0.0412*** 0.00371 
  (0.012) (0.014) (0.024) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.029) 
Violations x WSJ   0.000860     0.000834 
   (0.001)     (0.001) 
Violations x Royalty    -0.0953***    -0.0487 
    (0.025)    (0.036) 
Violations x Population     -0.000970   0.0111 
     (0.006)   (0.009) 
Violations x Sisters      0.000534  -0.000207 
      (0.001)  (0.002) 
Violations x Distance       -0.0108*** -0.00791* 
              (0.003) (0.004) 
log-likelihood -1094.7 -1088.0 -1086.9 -1080.0 -1088.0 -1087.9 -1080.1 -1077.2 
χ2 403.1 400.4 399.3 398.7 402.3 404.2 391.6 409.8 
N 7146 7146 7146 7146 7146 7146 7146 7146 
Standard errors in parentheses        











Results of Cox Proportional Hazard Model 
   
DV: Convert to franchise Model 1 Model 2 
  All  Without pre 1997 
Independent Variables Odds Ratio Odds Ratio 
Firm age 1.108** 1.160** 
 (0.039) (0.063) 
Firm performance 4.253*** 6.475*** 
 (1.232) (2.400) 
Multi-brand 0.0615*** 0.0802*** 
 (0.027) (0.042) 
Outlet size 1.211 1.199 
 (0.162) (0.208) 
Incumbent outlet 4.742*** - 
 (0.843) - 
Year dummy Included Included 
Firm dummy Included Included 
WSJ appearances 1.062*** 1.058*** 
 (0.010) (0.012) 
Royalty rate 0.850 0.694*** 
 (0.123) (0.046) 
Population  0.873+ 0.851* 
 (0.063) (0.062) 
Sister outlets 0.974*** 0.981* 
 (0.006) (0.008) 
Distance to HQ (100 mi) 0.968 1.004 









Table 8 (continued) 
      
   
DV: Convert to franchise Model 1 Model 2 
  All  Without pre 1997 
Independent Variables   
Violationsa  1.026** 1.031** 
 (0.009) (0.011) 
Violations x WSJ 1.001* 1.001* 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Violations x Royalty 0.992 1.014 
 (0.012) (0.013) 
Violations x Population 1.014** 1.014* 
 (0.005) (0.006) 
Violations x Sisters 1.000 1.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Violations x Distance 0.989*** 0.983*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
    
log-likelihood -2121.2 -1342.7 
χ2 721.8 584.6 
N 6210 4208 
      
Standard errors in parentheses  
+ p<0.10 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001  











Multinomial Logistic Regression 
Baseline:  Closure   Continuance 
Variables Continue Convert  Close Convert 
Firm age 0.953 1.110+  1.049 1.165*** 
 (0.043) (0.060)  (0.048) (0.037) 
Firm performance 0.962 6.429***  1.040 6.685*** 
 (0.269) (2.375)  (0.291) (1.643) 
Multi-brand 0.235*** 0.00975***  4.247*** 0.0414*** 
 (0.093) (0.006)  (1.674) (0.019) 
Outlet size 1.056*** 1.055***  0.947*** 0.999 
 (0.004) (0.005)  (0.004) (0.002) 
Incumbent outlet 0.401*** 0.434***  2.495*** 1.083 
 (0.081) (0.099)  (0.505) (0.119) 
WSJ appearances 1.010 1.087***  0.990 1.076*** 
 (0.018) (0.022)  (0.018) (0.011) 
Royalty rate 0.985 0.847  1.015 0.860 
 (0.074) (0.142)  (0.077) (0.129) 
Population  0.838 0.775  1.194 0.926 
 (0.129) (0.135)  (0.184) (0.083) 
Sister outlets 1.032* 0.989  0.969* 0.958*** 
 (0.016) (0.017)  (0.015) (0.007) 
Distance to HQ (100 mi) 1.363** 1.348*  0.734** 0.989 
 (0.162) (0.189)  (0.087) (0.077) 
Violations 1.173*** 1.222***  0.853*** 1.042*** 
 (0.037) (0.041)  (0.027) (0.013) 
Log likelihood -2050.4     
χ2 1538.4     
N  8296         
Relative Risk Ratios; Standard errors in parentheses.     
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